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Abstract 
What drives regulatees‘ behaviors when the institution of law is weak? This study seeks to 
answer the question by examining environmental regulation enforcement in China. Based on 
survey and interview data on Hong Kong-owned manufacturing enterprises in the Pearl River 
Delta Region, Guangdong Province, we found that their decisions to adopt basic and 
proactive environmental management practices were less driven by concerns for legality than 
by their perceptions of the regulators‘ actions and gestures. Enterprises adopted basic 
environmental practices to avoid potential punishment, and they adopted more proactive 
practices to avoid potentially arbitrary impositions from regulatory officials. Regulated 
enterprises were more likely to adopt both basic and proactive environmental practices if they 
had less difficulties understanding the enforced regulations. These findings suggest important 
ways in which regulatory compliance behaviors in a developmental context may differ from 
those in Western countries. 
 
Citation: Yee, Wai-Hang, Shui-Yan Tang, and Carlos Wing-Hung Lo. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory. (Forthcoming). 
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法律制度薄弱情况下的合规：以中国环保改革为例 
 
摘要 
在法律制度薄弱的情况下，什么因素影响着受监管者的行为？此项研究通过审视中国
环境保护法规的执行来解答这一问题。对位于广东省珠江三角洲的港资企业进行的问
卷和采访表明，企业在决定是否采取基本的或是能动的环境管理措施时，基于对监管
者的行为和态度的判断，比出于遵守法律的考虑更为重要。为防受惩罚，企业采取了
基本的环境管理措施；而当监管官员的管理具有不确定性时，企业采取了更能动的环
境管理措施。当被执行的规则更易理解时，企业则更可能采取基本以及能动的环境管
理措施。这些研究结果表明在发展中国家，合规行为与在西方发达国家存在重大区别
。  
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Most of the current regulatory compliance literature is based on data collected in 
Western countries (Winter and May 2001; May 2004; Gunningham, Thornton and Kagan 
2005; Hawkins 1984; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Levi 1997; Tyler 2006).  To what extent 
are findings in this literature applicable to developing countries?  In recent years, scholars of 
regulatory enforcement have shown increased interest in answering this question (e.g., 
Braithwaite 2006; Araral, forthcoming), but the number of rigorous studies on regulatory 
compliance has remained limited (see Levi and Sacks 2009 for an exception), especially in 
relation to what drives enterprises in developing countries to evade or comply with 
environmental regulations. 
In developing countries, regulatory enforcement and compliance are shaped by many 
contextual factors—for example, weak government capacity and legitimacy (Levi and Sacks 
2009), official corruption, and inadequate protection for private property rights.  In this paper, 
we examine one particular factor that is common across most developing countries—the lack 
of a governing framework that is supported by the rule of law. A brief review of the 
regulatory compliance literature shows that many of its key findings are premised on the 
existence of the rule of law.  For example, the common criticism on regulations being overly 
rigid or ―suffocating‖ (Bardach and Kagan 1982; Howard 1994) is valid only when the 
regulations are actually used by government officials as the authoritative guide for 
enforcement.  The criticism becomes less relevant if both the regulators and the regulated do 
not treat the specific details of the regulations seriously in the first place. Another example 
concerns the praise for a more responsive and flexible approach to regulatory enforcement 
(e.g., Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, Potoski and Prakash 2004). Such an approach is less likely 
to work if the regulators are widely perceived to be arbitrary, partial, or corrupt. A third 
example concerns the importance of a sense of duty as a supplement to coercion as a 
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motivation for compliance (Tyler 2006). Yet the duty metaphor loses its meaning if the 
regulations are widely perceived as unreasonable and arbitrary, and one will hardly develop 
any ―shameful‖ feeling for their violation (Grasmick and Bursik 1990). 
These examples raise critical issues about the applicability of many arguments and 
findings in the current literature to governance contexts in which the law is not highly 
regarded as a legitimate source of authority: What if the formal regulations fail to serve as a 
useful guide for the regulatees (for being, say, too vague in wording or too broad in 
coverage)? What if most of the regulated do not believe the regulators intend on enforcing the 
formal regulations? In many developing countries, adherence to the rule of law as a 
governance principle is an exception rather than the rule, yet governments do continue to pass 
laws and regulations, which presumably would have an effect on people‘s behaviors. What 
motivates regulatees‘ behaviors under this rather common situation where the rule of law is 
not well established? Is it possible to find compliance and beyond compliance behaviors 
when legal authorities enjoy relatively low legitimacy? If so, how can we explain these 
behaviors?  
This study seeks to answer these questions by examining environmental regulation 
enforcement in China. Based on survey and interview data on Hong Kong-owned 
manufacturing enterprises in the Pearl River Delta Region, Guangdong Province, we found 
that their decisions to adopt basic and proactive environmental management practices were 
less driven by a concern for legality than by their perceptions of the regulators‘ actions and 
gestures. Enterprises adopted basic environmental practices to avoid potential punishment, 
and they adopted more proactive practices to avoid potentially arbitrary impositions from 
regulatory officials. Regulated enterprises were less likely to adopt both basic and proactive 
environmental practices if they had more difficulties understanding the enforced regulations. 
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These finidngs suggest important ways in which regulatory compliance behaviors in a 
developmental context may differ from those in Western countries. Next we first introduce 
the history of China‘s environmental reform and its recent move towards a legislative and 
regulatory approach. We then review further the current regulatory compliance literature and 
develop several hypotheses by taking into account China‘s governance context, in which the 
rule of law is yet to be firmly established. 
 
China’s Environmental Reform and Regulatory Setting 
 
Thanks to Deng Xiaoping‘s Reform and Open (Gaige Kaifang) Policy in the early 
1980s, China has achieved remarkable economic growth in the past three decades. The 
growth, however, has also brought devastating impact on its environment (see e.g., SEI & 
UNDP China 2002; Economy 2004; Economy and Lieberthal 2007). In the past decade, the 
Chinese government has shown a stronger commitment to reforming its environmental 
governance (Lo and Tang 2006, 2014; Lo, Fryxell and van Rooij 2009), with some 
encouraging results (see e.g., PRC 2006, 2007, 2008; UNDP China and RUC 2010). The year 
2006 marked an important milestone as the central government decided to carry out the first 
national census on pollution sources.
1
 Concrete work plans were also created to reduce air 
and water pollution. In 2007, China experienced the first significant drop in both COD 
(chemical oxygen demand) and SO2 (sulfur dioxide) emissions.  
How did China change course after its prolonged negligence toward the environment? 
As documented in many previous studies, China‘s environmental reform has been mainly a 
state-led process (Lo and Tang 2006; Martens 2006; Shi and Zhang 2006). The country‘s first 
                                                 
1
 Retrieved March 26, 2012, from the webpage of The Central People‘s Government of the People‘s 
Republic of China, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_268766.htm. 
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Environmental Protection Office was established in 1974, right after the United Nations 
Stockholm Conference in 1972. With major economic reform beginning in the late 1970s, the 
State Commission for Environmental Protection was established several years later in 1984 
and was responsible for coordinating environmental responsibilities across ministries. This 
commission was upgraded in 1998 to become a semi-ministry-level government agency, the 
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). In 2008, SEPA was elevated to 
become a full-fledged ministry, the Ministry of Environmental Protection.  
Along with the enhancement of administrative capacity we saw a gradual change in 
regulatory enforcement approaches. Ever since the enactment of the first Environmental 
Protection Law in 1979, legislative efforts have resulted in an extensive set of environmental 
laws and regulations, covering such issues as pollution controls over air, water, solid waste, 
and noise, as well as natural resource conservation (see Beyer 2006 for review). Yet the 
Chinese government had been mostly relying on a campaign approach—that is, maintaining 
economic growth as the main developmental goal, while occasionally announcing ad-hoc 
measures to boost up environmental protection efforts (SEI and UNDP China 2002). In the 
past decade, this campaign approach has been gradually replaced by a legislative and 
regulatory approach (UNDP China and RUC 2010). 
This top-down, government-led regulatory reform has emphasized energy saving and 
emissions reduction among enterprises (PRC 2007; 2008; Lo, Fryxell and van Rooij 2009). 
Centralized sewage treatment facilities were built in urban areas, while stricter regulations 
required enterprises in major industrial sectors to install tertiary effluent-treatment facilities 
(PRC 2006, 2007, 2008). A number of pollution-discharge and clean-production standards 
were also established for major polluting industries, whereas enterprises causing serious 
pollution (e.g., paper mills, chemical plants, textiles, printing and dyeing enterprises, small 
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thermal power units, outdated cement, steel, iron, and plate-glass-making units) were phased 
out or shut down. In the meantime, some environment-friendly economic policies were 
introduced, including such schemes as Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance and green 
credit policies. Local governments were urged to pressure local enterprises to cut down on 
pollutant emissions and energy consumption. Enterprises in response have been increasingly 
adopting various environmental management practices, from such basic measures as 
recycling and processing their wastes and emissions, to proactive and holistic measures such 
as developing certifiable environmental management systems and investing in cleaner 
production technologies.  
Implementing the new legislative and regulatory approach, however, is not as 
straightforward as it may sound. Similar to many other policy and administrative reform 
initiatives in China, whether these government-led efforts can be sustained depends very 
much on the extent to which the initiatives are compatible with the country‘ governance 
sytem. Particularly, the move toward a regulatory enforcement approach took place at a time 
when China‘s legal system was also undergoing steady reform since the end of the Cultural 
Revolution. The rule of law was first recognized formally as a main principle of governance 
in 1997 (Yu 2010, 14). Instead of being dominated entirely by the Communist Party, the 
lawmaking process began to involve a broader array of governing entities, including the 
―State Council, the Communist Party Central apparatus, and the National People‘s Congress 
(NPC) and its Standing Committee‖ (Tanner 2003, 39). More recently, the court has been 
gradually playing a larger role in resolving ―rights-based grievances‖; judges are becoming 
more qualified, and increasingly looking into one another‘s judgments for reference 
(Liebman 2007). Constitutional amendments have also been introduced (for instance, the 
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Property Law was adopted in 2007
2) to further accommodate the country‘s economic reform 
(Clarke 2007). 
Despite these developments, China‘s legal system and its courts have yet to establish 
full independence, and there are many reasons to doubt if environmental laws and regulations 
are consistently enforced in practice. Apart from the relatively short history of legal reform, 
leaders of China seem to be interested in developing a legal system with Chinese 
characteristics. In a recent campaign led by the Party‘s Central Political-Legal Committee, 
legal practitioners were reminded of their loyalty to party leadership, their duty to serve ―the 
overall situation‖, and their role to establish the ―socialist rule of law‖ (Liebman 2007, 627). 
Entrenched local political networks, or ―local protectionisms‖, have also presented major 
obstacles for local courts seeking to implement their rulings (Pei 2001, 2006; Diamant, 
Lubman and O‘Brien 2005).  
With respect to environmental regulation enforcement, ―impossibly high‖ standards 
and weak local enforcement capability were often identified as major obstacles (SEI and 
UNDP China 2002, 80; Beyer 2006). Environmental regulations were worded ―vaguely‖, 
leaving  ―considerable scope for interpretation‖ (SEI and UNDP China 2002, 82; Beyer 2006, 
205-206). ―Contradictions‖ were observed in the assignment of implementation authorities 
among different branches and levels of government; many local officials were also said to be 
colluding with enterprises, requesting the latter to ―ignore [environmental] laws and 
regulations in their quest for ongoing GDP growth‖ (Economy and Lieberthal 2007, 92).  
There were reports about local environmental officials being more interested in running their 
environmental consulting firms than enforcing regulations, and some environmental officials 
                                                 
2
 Property Law of the People‘s Republic of China. Retrieved March 26, 2012, from the webpage of the 
Central People‘s Government of the People‘s Republic of China, http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-
03/19/content_554452.htm. 
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seeking bribes directly from regulated enterprises. At times when environmental issues 
become politically salient nationwide or in a particular jurisdiction, local enforcement 
officials may impose extraordinary demands on enterprises to stop all pollutant emissions on 
short notices (Lo and Tang 2014). 
From the perspective of enterprise executives, it remains highly haphazard when they 
try to respond to vaguely worded regulations and apparently arbitrary demands from local 
officials. For enterprise executives, it is often not just about understanding the regulations and 
coming up with the technologies and resources needed for compliance, but also trying to 
understand the actions, gestures, and priorities of the local officials, which in many cases may 
have little to do with the written regulations. How do enterprise executives behave in this 
regulatory setting? It is in this context we review further the literature on regulatory 
compliance. 
 
The Rule of Law and Regulatory Compliance 
 
The multifaceted impacts of the rule of law on the relationship between state and 
society are well documented in the contemporary literature. For scholars in development 
studies, the rule of law facilitates economic growth, as it protects property rights, guarantees 
individual security and liberty, constrains the power of government, and prevents corruption 
(e.g., Haggard and Tiede 2011; Murrell 2001). Political scientists are interested in its role in 
state building in democracies (e.g., Olson 1993; Weingast 1997). Public administration 
scholars are concerned about balancing legal and managerial values, and holding government 
officials accountable (Christensen, Goerdel and Nicholson-Crotty 2011; Kettl 2009; see also 
Rosenbloom, O‘Leary and Chanin 2010). Kettl (2009), for example, reminded us that the 
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rule-of-law convention was cited as a guarantee of individual rights as the Progressives 
advocated for greater government regulatory power to counteract the rise of big corporations 
(Wilson 1887, see Kettl 2009, 12).  
How does the rule of law affect regulatory compliance? According to A. V. Dicey 
(1982), the rule of law implies that (1) men are ruled by law and by law alone, (2) no one is 
above the law, and (3) the law is the result of ―the rights of individuals‖ and ―the ordinary 
law of the land‖ (emphasis added)3 (see also Bingham 2010). If these principles are followed 
in regulatory enforcement, (1) regulators‘ regulatory power will be dictated by relevant 
regulations; (2) regulations will be enforced consistently; and (3) regulatory enforcement is 
shaped by prevailing social practices and expectations. Major findings from the regulatory 
compliance literature largely relate to these three main expectations.  
The literature showed that regulatees comply with the regulations in order to avoid 
potential legal punishments and to fulfill their duty to obey the law (Becker 1968; Ehrlich 
1972; Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Tyler 2006; Scholz and Pinney 1995; Winter and May 
2001; May 2004). Later developments suggest that regulatees may, in some circumstances, 
engage in beyond-compliance behaviors (May 2005, 31; Potoski and Prakash 2004). 
Compliance and beyond-compliance behaviors may be encouraged by a cooperative 
regulaotry approach, which fosters reciprocal relationships between the regulators and the 
regulatees. This approach may reduce the need for more stringent or ―unreasonable‖ 
regulations in the future (Bardach and Kagan 1982; Hawkins 1984; Scholz 1984a, 1984b; 
Shapiro and Rabinowitz 1997; Potoski and Prakash 2004; May 2005; Koski and May 2006; 
                                                 
3
 ―[The rule of law] means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as 
opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or 
even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government. … It means, again, equality before the 
law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary Law 
Courts. … The ‗rule of law,‘ lastly, may be used as a formula for expressing the fact that with us the law of 
the constitution … are not the source but the consequence of the rights of individuals, … thus the 
constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land‖ (Dicey 1982: Part II: IV). 
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Press and Mazmanian 2010). These findings are in line with the first two expectations above 
that both the regulators and the regulatees treat the regulations seriously. 
The literature also found that compliance behaviors are driven socially, through the 
sanctions that the compliers‘ peers may invoke when they break the law or when they violate 
the societal norm related to the specific law (Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Tyler 2006; Winter 
and May 2001). Compliance is higher when strong social norms govern the regulated 
behaviors (Hawkins 1984; Posner 2000). ―Civil regulations‖, or regulations governing market 
actors without government enforcement, are also expected to encourage the regulatees‘ 
voluntary beyond-compliance behaviors (Vogel 2008). These findings suggest that 
regulatees‘ compliance and beyond-compliance behaviors are related to the social setting in 
which regulatees are embedded. 
Recent literature has also examined how compliance behaviors are affeced by 
regulatory information and enforcement styles. The literature suggests that regulatees 
possessing better regulatory information (such as details about specific requirements and the 
means to achieve them) will be more likely to comply (Winter and May 2002; Koski and 
May 2006; Lee 2010), though it is unclear how information may affect beyond-compliance 
behaviors. In terms of enforcement styles, two major styles are considered to be conducive to 
compliance (see May and Wood 2003). The first one is the ―formalistic‖ (May and Wood 
2003) or ―legalistic‖ style (Kagan 1994). It involves the regulator demanding compliance 
uniformly and consistently, as well as interpreting the regulations rather strictly and rigidly. 
Such a style fosters a sense of fairness among the regulatees, raising the perceived level of 
―ethical reciprocity‖ among them, and thus compliance rates (Levi 1997).  The other one is 
the ―facilitative‖ style.  Regulators with this style relate to the regulatees in a ―friendly‖ and 
―forgiving‖ manner (May and Wood 2003), demanding compliance ―flexibly‖ to foster trust 
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with the regulatees, and hence the latter‘s contribution to the regulatory goal in the long run 
(Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Potoski and Prakash 2004).
4
 
 
Hypotheses 
The first set of motivations reviewed above suggests that regulatees act according to the 
regulators‘ demands because of their concerns for legality. As the regulatees act to fulfill 
their sense of duty to the law, reduce the risk of lawsuits, and lower the odds for stricter 
legislation in the future, they tend to follow closely the laws and regulations, and thus are 
more likely to adopt compliance and beyond-compliance behaviors. 
H1: A concern for legality is positively related to enterprises’ compliance and 
beyond-compliance behaviors. 
Nevertheless, in China‘s governance context where the rule of law is not firmly established, 
these expectations need adjustments. First of all, regulations may serve as an indication of 
regulatory goals, but regulatees can no longer rely on them as the sole objective reference to 
decide on their compliance behaviors. From earlier discussion, we learned that China‘s legal 
system has yet to become fully independent, and the regulatory enforcement process has 
remained haphazard, being influenced by various local political interests and administrative 
malpractices. Deficiencies in the environmental regulations themselves (e.g., vague wording, 
unreasonable standards) also prevented them from being a reliable source of reference for the 
regulatees. If these accounts are accurate, the concern for legality is unlikely to be relevant in 
enterprises‘ decisions. It remains to be seen whether H1 is valid in the context of China. 
As discussed earlier, environmental laws and regulations are numerous in China.  Many 
of them are not clearly formulated, and local environmental officials may not enforce laws 
                                                 
4
 Other enforcement styles are also identified in the literature, including ―coercion‖, ―educational‖, 
―prioritization‖ and ―accommodation‖. See Lo, Fryxell and van Rooij (2009) for details.   
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and regulations consistently. It has often become a challenge for the regulated enterprises to 
understand which regulations are most relevant to their respective operations and how exactly 
officials will enforce them. Whether enterprise managers are able to understand the relevant 
requirements depends very much on the regulators‘ willingness, effort, and ability to help. If 
the regulatory officials are able to establish constructive relationships with the enterprises by 
providing clear indications about the behaviors required, together with sufficient technical 
advice and support, enterprise executives will have a better understanding of the enforced 
regulations and face less challenges in compliance. Otherwise, they will be less likely to 
engage in environmental compliance behaviors.  
H2a: An understanding of the enforced regulations is positively related to 
enterprises’ compliance behaviors. 
If regulators can help enterprise executives to understand the enforced regulations, this 
will encourage the latter to engage in beyond-compliance behaviors. When the rule of law is 
weak, the exercise of regulatory power depends very much on the regulators‘ will. When the 
written regulations cannot serve as a reliable reference, regulatees can easily become 
suspicious of the regulators‘ commitment to the regulatory goal. Such suspicion may severely 
undermine regulatees‘ willingness to engage in beyond-compliance behaviors. Yet if the 
regulatory officials manage to convey to the regulatees relevant information about what 
requirements are being enforced, such efforts represent an important commitment of the 
regulators to restrain their use of power and to pursue the regulatory goal. Thus the less 
challenges regulatees find in understanding the enforced regulations, the less likely will they 
be suspicious about the regulator‘s intention, and hence the more likely will they engage in 
beyond-compliance behaviors. 
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H2b: An understanding of the enforced regulations is positively related to 
enterprises’ beyond-compliance behaviors. 
Like their counterparts in Western countries, enterprise executives in China want to 
avoid regulatory punishment (Ehrlich 1972; Winter and May 2001; May 2004). In China, the 
extent of regulatory punishment may not be dictated by formal regulations based on severity 
of violation, but result from arbitrary impositions by the regulators. Regardless of origins, if 
enterprise executives do perceive a higher chance for substantial punishment, they are more 
likely to engage in compliance behaviors to ward off potential losses. Yet the motivations to 
prevent substantial punishment may not lead to beyond-compliance behaviors. 
H3a: A perception of potential punishment is positively related to 
enterprises’ compliance behaviors. 
H3b: A perception of potential punishment is not related to enterprises’ 
beyond- compliance behaviors. 
In Western countries, social expectations play a significant role in motivating enterprise 
executives to engage in environmental management practices. In general the stronger the 
demands from societal groups such as the media, the community, and NGOs, the more likely 
an enterprise cares about environmental management; similarly the stronger the demands 
from peer groups such as shareholders, employees, competitors, and industry associations, 
the more likely an enterprise cares about environmental management. In China, 
environmental demands from peers may have increased, but their effects on enterprises have 
been limited (Zhu and Sarkis 2006; Yee, Lo and Tang 2013). There have also been increasing 
societal concerns for pollution, but there is a lack of societal expectations for strict 
compliance with government regulations in general, regardless of policy arenas (Tang 2012).  
Although the media and the community have paid more attention to pollution issues and 
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some environmental NGOs have emerged in recent years, they have in general been quite 
restrained in directly criticizing government‘s regulatory enforcement practices (Tang and 
Zhan 2008; Zhan and Tang 2013).  Business executives tend not to believe that societal actors 
have the moral authority to compel them to follow regulations when most others ignore them 
any way.  
H4: Perceptions of demands from societal and peer groups are not related to 
enterprises’ compliance and beyond-compliance behaviors. 
As noted earlier, some combinations of ―legalistic‖ and ―facilitative‖ regulatory styles 
work well in the context of Western countries.  In China where laws and regulations cannot 
be relied on as a useful reference for compliance, will regulators regulating too flexibly be 
perceived by regulatees as partial and inconsistent? Will regulators applying the same 
standard to all be seen as too tough or too rigid?  A major concern for regulatees in China is 
the high probability that the regulators may abuse their power. While formal punishment 
informs the regulatees about basic regulatory requirements, any partial relaxation of old 
standards or use of new standards may easily lead the regulatees to believe that the regulators 
are regulating arbitrarily—demanding inconsistently from different regulatees, giving favors 
to some while treating others unreasonably and unfairly. In response to such uncertainty, 
regulatees are likely to try to anticipate and stay away from the regulators‘ interference in 
order to foster a more stable environment for their operations. Enterprise owners are more 
likely to engage in compliance and beyond-compliance behaviors if they believe that local 
regulatory officials specifically target them for enforcement. There may be a variety of 
reasons why a particular enterprise may be arbitrarily targeted: the enterprise lacks political 
backing from high-level officials in the jurisdiction; the enterprise is located in a highly 
visible location; or the regulatory officials believe the enterprise has more available 
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resources.  Regardless of the underlying reasons, enterprise executives in China understand 
that if the regulatory officials really target them, there is not much they can do other than 
finding ways to comply with, or even go beyond their demands in order to avoid being a 
target in the first place. Thus, the higher the perception of being arbitrarily targeted, the more 
likely will the enterprises engage in compliance and beyond-compliance environmental 
behaviors.  
H5a: A perception of being arbitrarily targeted in regulatory enforcement is 
positively related to enterprises’ compliance behaviors. 
H5b: A perception of being arbitrarily targeted in regulatory enforcement is 
positively related to enterprises’ beyond-compliance behaviors. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The data were collected through a large-scale survey of senior executives of Hong 
Kong-owned, small and medium enterprises that maintained manufacturing operations in the 
Pearl River Delta (PRD) region of Guangdong Province. The region is widely regarded as the 
frontier of reform towards the use of a legislative and regulatory approach in environmental 
governance (see UNDP China and RUC 2010). Experiences in the region represent an 
―extreme‖, best-case scenario in the implementation of China‘s environmental reform 
(Flyvberg 2006).  
Hong Kong-owned enterprises are particularly suitable for the analysis as their 
executives are likely to be more familiar with the international legal environment than their 
mainland counterparts. A former British colony, Hong Kong has one of the world‘s freest 
market economies. After its return to China in 1997, the Special Administrative Region has 
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maintained the common-law tradition.  In comparison with their mainland counterparts, 
enterprise executives from Hong Kong are more familiar with operating in a legal-
institutional environment typical of developed economies.  
The survey was conducted in cooperation with the Federation of Hong Kong 
Industries (FHKI) in 2007 and the questionnaire was mailed to the most senior executive of 
each company listed in the FHKI‘s 2007 Members‘ Directory. A total of 1,800 questionnaires 
were sent, and 377 responses were received, representing a response rate of 21 percent. The 
response rate was reasonable considering that the survey asked for politically sensitive 
information about the enterprises‘ environmental practices.  Possible self-selection bias 
should be taken into account when interpreting the findings, as those who were more eager to 
adopt environmental practices might be more likely to respond to the survey.  As will be 
explained later, steps have been taken to remedy this possible bias. Overall, the enterprises 
participating in the survey were diverse in terms of size and industrial sector (see Table 2).  
To help interpret findings from the survey data, we also conducted a series of in-
depth, semi-structured interviews with a selected group of companies from the same 
Directory (see Appendix A). We adopted a convenient sampling method by selecting 
companies that had been recognized with environmental awards for their outstanding 
environmental performance. A total of 27 representatives, chiefly senior executives and 
environmental managers, from 17 companies were interviewed in their offices from January 
to June 2010. Each interview lasted for about an hour. 
 
Measurement  
We measured an enterprise‘s environmental behaviors by asking the respondents, 
―How well are the following activities integrated into your company‘s business model?‖ A 
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list of 16 corporate environmental management practices (EMPs) were provided, which 
contained items ranging from minimal measures such as ―recycling of waste streams‖ and 
―using filters and other emission controls in our production process‖, to more proactive and 
comprehensive ones such as ―developing certifiable environmental management systems‖ 
and ―incorporating ecological themes when marketing our products‖ (see Table 3). 
Respondents were asked to ―use 1 to 7 to describe the operational situation‖ of these practices 
in their company (1 = never considered; 2 = considered, but no action taken; 3 = 
experimented with, but did not adopt; 4 = have adopted, but does not seem to be a priority; 5 
= adopted and emphasized; 6 = fully integrated into all functions of the company; 7 = a way 
of life) (see Table 1).  
Taking into account the distinction between compliance and beyond-compliance 
practices in the literature (May 2005; Potoski and Prakash 2004), we conducted a principal 
component factor analysis (with varimax rotation) on all the 16 EMPs. A two-factor solution 
was extracted in the analysis; the first factor is termed basic practices and the second 
proactive practices (see Table 3). 
We measured the variable concern for legality by asking the respondents to rate how 
likely certain outcomes their company can achieve by adopting better environmental 
protection measures. The variable was aggregated from the scores of these questions: (1) 
―better comply with existing environmental regulations‖; (2) ―avoid facing stricter 
environmental regulations in the future‖; and (3) ―reduce the risk of lawsuits‖.  
For the variable understanding of the enforced regulations, we asked the respondents 
to rate their agreement with a list of challenges they faced in complying with environmental 
regulations. The variable was formed by aggregating the reversed scores attained in the 
following items (1) ―many environmental regulations are too complicated for us to fully 
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understand‖, (2) ―our relationship with the local environmental protection bureau (EPB) has 
not been as constructive as it probably should be‖, and (3) ―we have been unable to get 
sufficient technical support from the local EPB‖. 
To measure the perception of potential punishment, we asked the respondents whether 
(1) the pollution discharge fees and (2) pollution fines are an insignificant amount in terms of 
expenses for their company, the sum of the reversed scores were then multiplied with the 
reversed score of a third question (3) whether it is difficult for the local EPB to detect their 
regulatory violations. This multiplication method resembles how the expected value of 
regulatory punishment may be calculated for individual regulatees, i.e., multiplying the 
perceived potential amount of punishment with the perceived likelihood of detection. The 
questions might not appear to be measuring directly potential punishment at first glance; they 
were so designed because of the sensitive nature of the requested information. To encourage 
the respondents to give an honest and accurate response, we put the above questions in the 
section ―Challenges to Environmental Compliance‖, hoping that respondents would interpret 
the questions as measuring whether they perceived the potential punishment—the 
―challenge‖—to be strong and likely (or weak and unlikely) enough to affect their 
environmental behaviors. 
To measure demands from societal and peer groups, we asked the respondents to rate 
how strongly various actors demanded that their companies adopt EMPs. Their responses 
were grouped into two variables: the first one was termed demands from peer groups, 
consisting of demands from actors who frequently interacted with the respondent, i.e., (1) 
shareholders, (2) employees, (3) major competitors, and (4) industry associations; the second 
one was termed demands from societal groups, consisting of demands from civil society 
actors who may be interested in environmental advocacy, i.e., (1) environmental interest 
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groups, (2) community (via means such as the internet, blogs, boycotts, or demonstrations), 
and (3) media organizations. 
Similarly, to measure the perception of being arbitrarily targeted in regulatory 
enforcement, we asked the respondents to rate the following items: (1) ―the local EPB is 
inconsistent in their enforcement of environmental regulations‖, (2) ―the local EPB does not 
seem interested in really trying to understand our difficulties in trying to comply with local 
environmental regulations‖, and (3) ―the local EPB has been very much ‗picking‘ on us in the 
enforcement of environmental regulations‖. The scores were aggregated to form the variable.  
Several control variables were used.  Specifically, we used the variable company 
benefit to control for the benefits an enterprise may receive by adopting EMPs.  Following 
the literature on corporate environmental management, we also controlled for firm size, 
financial status, as well as export-orientation  (see Bansal 2005). We also acknowledged the 
influences of enterprise owners‘ personal commitment to the environment cause, as well as 
the potential self-selection bias that more environmentally committed respondents would be 
more likely to respond to the survey. The control variable commitment to environmental 
protection was derived to address these issues. The variable was aggregated from 
respondents‘ agreement to the following items: (1) ―we are personally interested in 
developing and implementing environmental protection measures within the company‖, (2) 
―we want to be viewed as leaders in environmental protection in our industry sector‖, and (3) 
―we recognize that the company has an ethical responsibility to adopt better environmental 
protection measures.‖ 
 
Findings 
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Table 1 shows the list of variables and their measurements. Table 2 displays the 
descriptive statistics and the correlations for all variables. Table 4 presents two ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression models for the adoption of basic as well as proactive practices. The 
analyses showed that in China‘s governance context, enterprises‘ basic and proactive 
practices were not significantly associated with their executives‘ concern for legality (H1). 
Perceived demands from societal groups and peer groups were not significantly related to 
environmental practices in general, except that significant association was observed between 
perceived demands from peer groups and proactive practices (H4). Enterprise executives‘ 
understanding of the enforced regulations was significantly and positively associated with 
both basic practices and proactive practices (H2a & H2b). Meanwhile, a perception of 
potential punishment was significantly and positively associated with basic practices, but not 
with proactive practices (H3a & H3b). Finally, enterprise executives‘ perception of being 
arbitrarily targeted in regulatory enforcement was significantly and positively associated 
with proactive practices (H5b) but not with basic practices (H5a).  
Consistent with the overall argument that formal environmental laws and regulations 
by themselves are not useful guides for enterprises‘ environmental behaviors, we did not find 
significant support for H1. As described vividly by one of our interviewees, environmental 
regulations in China were ―relatively vague‖ and ―there [was] not much that can be relied on 
as reference‖. To him, decisions of regulatory enforcement depended very much on the will 
of the regulators.  
For enterprises investing in the mainland, the greatest difficulty is that the 
[environmental] rules and regulations (制度, zhidu) are relatively vague. There is 
not much that can be relied on as reference (依據, yiju). It is purely ―man-made‖ 
(人為, renwei). For every generation of [Party] secretary, when he came to this 
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town to assume office … if it so happened that a certain [political/policy] wind 
was blowing, he would then bring his ―flyswatter‖ (蒼蠅拍, cangyinpai) and 
squash continuously.
5
  
An implication of this regulator-driven approach was that potential punishment 
inflicted by local regulators became a major inducement for enterprises‘ environmental 
behaviors.  This is supported by the result that a perception of potential punishment was 
significantly associated with enterprises‘ adoption of basic environmental practices. This 
point can be illustrated by a comment from an interviewee, who ran an environmentally 
progressive company. In his assessment, his company protected the environment ―actively 
and voluntarily‖ without being urged, while others in the industry did it passively, and 
resembled ―children‖ who were forced by their parents.  
Relatively speaking, our company is moving faster than others. I estimate that 
some companies in the industry are not doing it actively and voluntarily [主動, 
zhudong]. Since in the mainland the standard is getting stricter and stricter… for 
example, some practices reported in newspapers in the past are no longer allowed 
nowadays. You must refrain from doing it, or there will not be licenses issued. 
Therefore, if you do it passively [被動, beidong], it is like children who study 
only when the parents beat and scold them [打罵, dama]. [But] just like [the 
interviewer], he does not need the urge of his parents. He studies because he 
thinks that it enhances his knowledge. He is doing it actively and voluntarily. 
Here, we have two different attitudes. If you do it actively and voluntarily, you 
will self-consciously find things to do. Since our factory has a very large scale, 
there are ―thousands of strands and loose ends‖ [千頭萬緒, qiantouwanxu] – 
                                                 
5
 Interview with O. 
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there is much room for improvement, and it is not finished when you have just 
done some. Why [should we] wait till the government presses us? We should do it 
actively and voluntarily.
6
 
Apparently, many enterprises would comply only when there was continuous monitoring 
from regulatory officials backed up by proportional punishment. Potential punishment, in 
other words, was a major method for motivating environmental behaviors in China‘s 
regulatory setting.  
Since rules and regulations were many and vague, regulators had large discretion on 
what is actually enforced.  As shown in the regression models, enterprise executives‘ 
understanding about the enforced regulations was highly relevant to their adoption of 
environmental practices, both basic and proactive. From the interviews, we learned that many 
executives found it challenging to identify the standards used in enforcement, so much so that 
they felt that there was no effective guideline constraining the regulatory officials‘ power. 
Such a skeptical view on regulators‘ intentions can be illustrated by the experience of an 
interviewee.  According to him, a factory in his enterprise was often visited by some local 
government officials; they requested without referencing any specific laws or regulations that 
his factory ―do better‖ on various environmental measures that were already in place. This 
incident happened in a large northeastern city. In response, the interviewee said that he met 
with the factory‘s general manager and sought to find out whether other firms in the same 
area faced the same type of demand.  Since the answer was positive, he asked the manager to 
―try [his] best to please them [the government officials] when they visit again, but at the same 
time we [the enterprise] will have to do something as well‖. It appeared that his limited 
understanding about the enforced regulations had made him suspicious and relutant to 
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comply at first. Yet after clarifying with the managers about the existence of the enforced 
regulations, he decided to cooperate further with the regulator‘s demand. 
… But in the Dalian factory, local municipal government officials came and 
visited us to ask us, ―your company … ICP, ventilation … though you have 
done it, we want you to do it better‖. But they would not bring up a law to talk 
to you. … ―We have a number of consultancy companies. Try one of them‖. 
… Actually they would like to make money. … [If you do well, will there be 
less interference?] Actually, I had discussed with the GM [general manager] 
there, [asking] ―Did they only bother [the company‘s name]? [He replied], 
―No‖. He said in the past few months these officials visit every [company] one 
by one. … Try your [the manager] best to please them [the government 
officials] when they visit again, but at the same time [the enterprise] will have 
to do something as well‖.  7 
Such an attitude changed if regulatory officials demonstrated a willingness to ease their 
suspicion and show clearer expectations. Consider an interviewee whose company was 
identified as the ―dragonhead‖ of the industry and was asked to do ―more than enough‖ in 
environmental protection. Interestingly, he saw this pressure from the local government 
officials as ―positive influence‖ on the industry. As reported, the local authority did not 
impose on the enterprise some predetermined standards but sent some ―experts specialized in 
the operation of the industry‖ to develop environmental solutions together with the 
enterprise.
8
 These acts might have helped ease the interviewee‘s suspicion about the 
regulator‘s intention and increased the regulatee‘s willingness to help achieve the regulatory 
goal. Notably, the above interpretation is somewhat different from the functional role of 
                                                 
7
 Interview with A.  
8
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regulatory information portrayed in the literature. We will discuss this further in the next 
section. 
With respect to the enterprise executives‘ perception of being arbitrarily targeted in 
regulatory enforcement, we found that they interpreted it as unreasonable threats to their 
operations, causing them to adopt a more cautious and proactive compliance strategy. As one 
of our interviewees commented, the environmental laws in China were very ―comprehensive‖ 
and at the same time ―vague‖, so much so that the regulator could charge the company with 
almost anything.  
We always tell them [global customers], China‘s [environmental] laws are more 
comprehensive than the sum total of all those in the U.S. and Europe. It is a 
matter of enforcement. It is not a matter of […], because the laws [China‘s 
environmental laws] are very vague. If they want to charge you, everything of you 
can be charged (emphasis added). Therefore, it is not a matter of the law.
9
 
An interviewee from another company explained further the logic behind this cautious 
strategy. As reported, the government authority often came to monitor the company, ―gave 
[its] opinion‖, and introduced to the company some ―[environmental] consulting companies‖, 
which charged a ―very, very high price‖ for improving some of his company‘s production 
processes. To avoid this, he found himself a licensed environmental [consulting] company, 
with whom he has now been partnering for more than a decade. Very often, he would 
introduce this consulting company to other enterprises in the same industry or in the same 
town. In the words of the interviewee, he had been doing this for his ―self-protection,‖ ―in 
order to avoid … [the government‘s] harsh demand for correction‖.  
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We are actually self-protecting (自保, zibao). Truly speaking, in two words, it is 
―self-protection‖ for our enterprise, in order to shield ourselves from the so-called 
government functional departments and their rather harsh demand for correction 
in our enterprise. For the demand for correction, there is completely no need [for 
the officials] to consider our problems. All they care is how they may report to 
their supervisor (交差, jiaocha).10   
Evidently, a proactive compliance strategy was essential for these enterprises to anticipate 
local regulators‘ requirements, and correspondingly keep them away from arbitrary 
impositions.  
Regarding social expectations, we did not observe any significant relationship 
between demands from societal groups and enterprises‘ environmental practices. This finding 
was in line with our expectation that the norm of environmental protection was yet to be 
firmly developed among civil society actors, and thus not strong enough to influence 
enterprises significantly. In fact, a great majority of our interviewees reported that they saw 
themselves as leaders of their community and felt themselves being responsible to the well-
being of the local community and the next generation (see also Yee, Lo and Tang 2013). It 
remained unclear, nonetheless, why there was a significant positive relation between 
demands from peer groups and the adoption of proactive practice but not basic practice. We 
learned from our interviewees that extra environmental protection efforts had largely been 
pioneered by international companies, followed by local industrial leaders (i.e., our 
interviewees), and subsequently smaller companies down the supply chain (see also Yee, Lo 
and Tang 2013).  Enterprises at the frontier of this trend are more likely to meet various 
international standards by adopting, for instance, certifiable environmental management 
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systems and conducting product life-cycle impact assessments. Interacting with shareholders 
and competitors will likely lead them to focus even more on fostering proactive 
environmental practices. More research is needed to sort out further the effects of peer 
influence. 
Overall speaking, the empirical findings correspond to our expectations that the 
promotion of environmental protection in China has remained largely state-led, and that 
regulatees‘ environmental behaviors have been largely regulator-driven. Given China‘s 
governance context, threats of regulatory punishment were key inducements for adopting 
basic environmental practices, while concerns for legality and demands from societal groups 
were not particularly relevant to enterprise executives‘ environmental practices. As written 
regulations failed to serve as a reliable reference, challenges in understanding the enforced 
regulations easily created suspicions on the regulators‘ intention. Thus the better the 
understanding of the enforced regulations, the less suspicion, and the more likely the 
enterprises acted in an environmentally responsible way.  Meanwhile, enterprises‘ perception 
of being targeted arbitrarily in regulatory enforcement would lead enterprises to adopt a 
cautious and proactive strategy to deal with officials‘ potentially unreasonable demands. 
Further investigation is needed though to understand its relationship with the adoption of 
basic environmental practices. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
With an aim to understand regulatees‘ behaviors in developing countries, this study 
examined the applicability of existing regulatory compliance literature to the governance 
context of China. Various compliance and beyond-compliance motivations were tested 
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among enterprise executives operating in Guangdong under the country‘s recent 
environmental reform. The reform presents an interesting case—despite the central 
government‘s effort to adopt a legislative and regulatory approach to environmental 
governance, the country‘s legal institutions are yet to be firmly established. It is against this 
context we discuss the theoretical implications of our findings. 
Our analysis suggests the need to distinguish between whether regulatees‘ behaviors 
are regulation-driven or regulator-driven. In regulatory settings where the rule of law is 
relatively weak, regulatees are less likely to see regulations as a reliable reference for 
behaviors, or as a meaningful constraint on regulators‘ discretionary power. In contrast to 
theoretical expectations in the current literature (Scholz and Pinney 1995; Tyler 2006), 
regulatees‘ compliance and beyond-compliance practices in China are less likely to be driven 
by a concern for legality.  Instead, they are likely to be regulator-driven. For compliance 
practices, regulatees behave similarly to theoretical expectations of the literature (Winter and 
May 2001; Lee 2010): regulatees‘ compliance increases with increased perceptions of 
potential punishment, as well as with their understanding about what is being enforced.  
Regulatees‘ beyond-compliance behaviors also vary positively with their understanding of the 
enforced regulations, and positively with their perceptions of being targeted arbitrarily in 
regulatory enforcement. Unclear understanding about the enforced regulations makes 
enterprise executives suspicious about the regulators‘ commitment to the regulatory goal, 
thus lowering their willingness to engage in beyond-compliance practices; whereas a 
perception of being targeted arbitrarily in regulatory enforcement encourages enterprise 
executives to adopt beyond-compliance practices as a way to fend off unreasonable 
interference from the regulators.  
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Our analysis suggests important policy implications and new directions for future 
research. First of all, the analysis suggests a different role for regulatory information. While 
the literature understands regulatory knowledge as politically neutral, informing the 
regulatees what and how to comply (Lee 2010), our findings showed that good knowledge 
about regulators‘ enforced regulations may enhance beyond-compliance behaviors in the 
Chinese context; such knowledge creates confidence on the part of the regulatees, allowing 
them to trust the regulators‘ motive and commit further to the regulatory goal. In other words, 
showing recognizable enforcement standards and understandable compliance guidelines can 
not only empower the regulatees, but more importantly demonstrate the regulators‘ 
commitment to the regulatory goal, reducing the regulatees‘ suspicion against the regulator, 
and increasing their likelihood to adopt beyond-compliance practices. This strategy provides 
a possible way for developing countries such as China to develop a more effective legislative 
and regulatory approach to environmental governance. 
Regarding enforcement styles, the literature recommends a flexible approach that 
punishes non-cooperative regulatees but forgives cooperative ones, who show credible 
commitment to the regulatory goal, for occasional minor violations. This approach would 
supposedly enhance trust building between regulators and regulatees, generating greater 
compliance and beyond-compliance (e.g., Scholz 1984a, 1984b; Potoski and Prakash 2004). 
Our analysis suggests that simply adopting a more reasonable and regulatee-friendly 
approach in a developmental context like China‘s is likely to encounter setbacks for two 
reasons. First, when regulations fail to serve as a reliable guide, regulators‘ partial relaxation 
of the regulatory standard without simultaneously demonstrating clearly their commitment to 
the regulatory goal would create confusion among the regulatees about what is truly being 
enforced. It would deepen regulatees‘ suspicion against the regulators, making the former less 
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willing to act in accordance with the regulatory goal. Second, regulatory punishment remains 
indispensable for inducing compliance behaviors. In fact, some scholars have suggested the 
need for China to continue or even strengthen its former political-campaign approach (van 
Rooij 2006, 57), which better balances local interests and ―their relation with the legal 
system‖, potentially enhancing regulatory effectiveness.11 As far as regulatory effectiveness 
is concerned, continuous inspection and punishment are essential for compliance when the 
rule of law remains relatively weak. 
A perception of being arbitrarily targeted in regulatory enforcement induces beyond-
compliance behaviors. When the written regulations cannot be relied on as reliable reference, 
gestures and actions of the regulators may easily generate a sense of fear on the part of the 
regulatees, making them especially cautious in order to stay away from potential troubles 
with the regulators. Yet whether this enforcement style is compatible with the establishment 
of a rule-based regulatory approach is open to question. The targeted regulatees may develop 
negative feelings about the regulators as being unfair, partial, and inconsistent; such an 
enforcement style may also create opportunities for corrupt officials to take bribes from 
regulatees. Nonetheless, a targeted increase in enforcement may be particularly useful when 
local regulators lack the resources to carry out full-scale enforcement.
12
 
Enterprise executives from Hong Kong are personally well acquainted with the rule of 
law. Yet when they operate in Mainland China, they are less influenced by a concern for 
legality, and are driven by their wish to avoid potential exploitation from regulatory officials.   
This shows the importance of governance context in shaping motivations for compliance and 
beyond-compliance practices. The rule of law and the extent to which it is ―recognized and 
                                                 
11
 ―The use of political campaigns to enhance enforcement in China shows that the flexibility of political 
short-term policy instruments can offer incremental improvements to enhance the balance between the 
conflicting interests themselves and their relation with the legal system‖. (van Rooij 2006, 57) 
12
 The authors thank the anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point. 
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accepted‖ in a specific governance context is an important factor shaping regulatory 
enforcement and compliance (see Searle 2010). Policymakers must examine carefully a 
country‘s governance context before recommending regulatory approaches (see also Levi and 
Spiller 1994).  Future research in regulatory enforcement must extend the scope of empirical 
investigation to cover experiences in developing countries, and to examine more 
systematically the interplay between regulators and regulatees in diverse governance settings. 
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Tables and Appendix 
 
Table 1 Variables and Measures 
Variables Measures 
Environmental Management 
Practices (EMPs) 
Respondents were given a list of corporate environmental management 
practices and asked: ―How well integrated are the following activities into 
your company‘s business model?‖ The response scale for these questions 
ranged from 1, ―never considered‖, through the midpoint ―have adopted, but 
does not seem to be a priority‖ to 7, ―a way of life‖. 
Basic practices  
(alpha = .845) 
Derived from principal component analysis of a list of corporate EMPs (see 
Table 3).  
Proactive practices 
(alpha = .943) 
Derived from principal component analysis of a list of corporate EMPs (see 
Table 3). 
Concern for legality 
(alpha = .746) 
 
Respondents were asked to rate the likelihood of the outcomes that their 
company can achieve by adopting better environmental protection 
measures. The response scale for these questions ranged from 1, ―strongly 
disagree‖, through the midpoint ―neutral‖ to 7, ―strongly agree‖.  
- Better comply with existing environmental regulations 
- Avoid facing stricter environmental regulations in the future 
- Reduce the risk of lawsuits 
Understanding of the 
enforced regulation 
(alpha = .795) 
Respondents were asked to rate the challenges their company faces in 
complying with environmental regulations. The response scale for these 
questions ranged from 1, ―strongly disagree‖, through the midpoint 
―neutral‖ to 7, ―strongly agree‖. The composite score is calculated by 
reversing the ratings. 
- Many environmental regulations are too complicated for us to fully 
understand 
- Our relationship with local EPB has not been as constructive as it probably 
should be 
- We have been unable to get sufficient technical support from local EPB 
Perception of potential 
punishment 
Respondents were asked to rate, from 1, ―strongly disagree‖ to 7, ―strongly 
agree‖ with the following statements. The score is calculated by reversing 
the ratings, and multiplying the first item with the sum of the last two items.  
- It is difficult for the EPB to detect regulatory violations by our company  
- The pollution discharge fees paid by our company are an insignificant 
amount in terms of expenses for our company  
- The pollution fines are an insignificant amount in terms of expenses for 
our company 
Demands from societal and 
peer groups 
Respondents were given a list of stakeholder groups and asked to rate their 
influence on the respondent‘s company to develop better environmental 
protection measures. The response scale for these questions ranged from 1, 
―strongly disagree‖, through the midpoint ―neutral‖ to 7, ―strongly agree‖.  
Demands from societal 
groups (alpha = .836) 
- Environmental interest groups 
- The community via other means (e.g., internet, bloggers, boycotts, or 
demonstrations) 
- Media organizations (e.g., officials newspaper and broadcast media) 
Demands from peer groups 
(alpha = .873) 
- Shareholders 
- Employees 
- Major competitors (i.e., through fear of losing business to them) 
- Industry associations 
 
Perception of being Respondents were asked to rate the challenges their company faces in 
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arbitrarily targeted in 
regulatory enforcement 
(alpha = .863) 
 
complying with environmental regulations. The response scale for these 
questions ranged from 1, ―strongly disagree‖, through the midpoint 
―neutral‖ to 7, ―strongly agree‖.13  
- The local EPB is inconsistent in their enforcement of environmental 
regulations 
- The local environmental protection bureau (EPB) does not seem interested 
in really trying to understand our difficulties in trying to comply with local 
environmental regulations 
- The local EPB has been very much ‗picking‘ on us in the enforcement of 
environmental regulations 
Company benefit  
(alpha = .776) 
 
 
Respondents were asked to rate the likelihood of the outcomes that their 
company can achieve by adopting better environmental protection 
measures. The response scale for these questions ranged from 1, ―strongly 
disagree‖, through the midpoint ―neutral‖ to 7, ―strongly agree‖.  
- Lower production costs 
- Improve our corporate reputation 
- Improve the quality of our products 
- Increase the customer base of its products 
Firm size 
 
 
Respondents were asked for the number of employees in their business, 
which were coded correspondingly: 1 for <100; 2, 100-499; 3, 500-599; 4, 
1000-4999; 5, >5000. 
Financial status 
 
 
Firms were asked about their yearly profit in 2006. Choices were given 
ranging from ―making a serious loss‖ (denoted as -2) to ―making a 
substantial profit‖ (denoted as 2). The higher the score, the more profit a 
firm made in 2006.   
Export-orientation 
 
 
Firms were asked to indicate ―the percentage of [their] product sold to 
overseas markets‖. Whether a firm is export-oriented was coded as a 
dummy variable, with 1 denoting firms than export more 50% of their 
product, and 0 otherwise. 
Commitment to 
environmental protection 
(alpha = .855) 
Respondents were asked to rate, from 1, ―strongly disagree‖ to 7, ―strongly 
agree‖ with the following statements. The score is aggregated by summation 
to indicate the top management commitment to environmental protection.  
- We are personally interested in developing and implementing 
environmental protection measures within the company 
- We want to be viewed as leaders in environmental protection in our 
industry sector 
- We recognize that the company has an ethical responsibility to adopt 
better environmental protection measures 
 
                                                 
13
 Items for both the variables understanding of the enforced regulations and perception of being 
arbitrarily targeted in regulatory enforcement come from the same survey question, which asked the 
respondents to rate the challenges their company faces in complying with environmental regulations. 
Principal component factor analysis (with varimax rotation) were conducted with these items, and a two-
factor solution was extracted with very good loadings (.696-.882) (see Appendix B).   
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients (n=312) 
 
Firm size (employees): <100 = 13.5%; 100–999 = 46.5%; 1000–4999 = 30.1%; >5000 = 9.9%.  
Industry: Plastics: 17.3%; Electronics: 18.9%; Textiles & Dyeing: 12.5%; Chemical, Paper, Electroplating, Cement: 7.1%; Others: 44.2%.  
 
 N Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Basic practices  301 16.797 5.461             
2. Proactive practices  294 40.442 17.426 .736            
3. Company benefit 309 19.563 3.930 .440 .531           
4. Firm size 312 2.933 1.239 .256 .353 .194          
5. Financial status 305 .548 .9097 .080 .197 .167 .196         
6. Export-orientation 287 .767 .424 .150 .071 .035 .229 -.042        
7. Commitment to environmental protection 310 15.258 3.115 .587 .628 .520 .196 .176 -.020       
8. Concern for legality 308 16.016 2.816 .379 .443 .588 .234 .122 .096 .466      
9. Understanding of the enforced regulation 309 10.939 2.774 .267 .312 .173 .134 .232 .015 .217 .106     
10. Perception of potential punishment 300 34.103 12.582 .214 .191 .190 .087 .138 -.019 .171 .244 .322    
11. Demands from societal groups 302 9.9603 3.686 .026 .005 .023 -.015 -.057 .118 .048 .028 -.067 -.077   
12. Demands from peer groups  305 15.066 5.034 .260 .301 .298 .132 .005 .139 .328 .219 .064 .031 .659  
13. Perception of being arbitrarily targeted in regulatory 
enforcement 
307 13.808 2.873 -.117 -.118 -.139 -.144 -.192 .031 -.131 .050 -.568 -.283 .114 -.015 
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Table 3 Dimensions of EMPs 
 Loadings 
 
Proactive practice Basic practice 
Measuring key aspects of our business‘s environmental performance .805 .287 
Including environmental performance measures in our management evaluation .800 .378 
Scientifically assessing the life-cycle impact of our products .790 .160 
Setting environmental performance objectives as part of our annual business plan .789 .368 
Preparation and release of environmental reports .765 .248 
Company displays about environmental programs .696 .407 
Developing certifiable environmental management systems .675 .249 
Making investments in clean production technologies .666 .309 
Participation in government-sponsored environmental programs .641 .245 
Incorporating ecological themes when marketing our products .633 .459 
Sponsorship of events about environmental protection .618 .336 
Routine environmental audits .603 .548 
Recycling waste streams .091 .816 
Environmental training for operatives .448 .773 
Environmental training for managers .436 .762 
Using filters and other emission controls in our production process .334 .639 
Eigenvalue 6.568 3.708 
 Variance explained 41.052% 23.175% 
Dimensions were derived using principal component analysis with varimax rotation; same dimensions were obtained using oblimin 
rotation. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index = .938; Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity is significant at 0.001 level.
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Table 4 OLS Regression Models on EMPs adoption 
 
 
Basic practices 
(n = 256) 
Proactive practices 
(n = 249) 
 
Standardized 
Beta t Sig. 
Standardized 
Beta t Sig. 
(Constant)  -2.900 .004  -5.985 .000 
Company benefit  
.101 1.588 .114 .188*** 3.257 .001 
Firm size 
.102** 2.002 .046 .153*** 3.298 .001 
Financial status 
-.100** -2.034 .043 .017 .387 .699 
Export-orientation 
.104** 2.121 .035 .012 .273 .785 
Commitment to environmental 
protection 
.457*** 7.631 .000 .433*** 8.031 .000 
Concern for legality 
.064 1.003 .317 .043 .760 .448 
Understanding of the enforced 
regulation 
.140** 2.352 .019 .215*** 3.926 .000 
Perception of potential 
punishment 
.132** 2.579 .010 .037 .796 .427 
Demands from societal groups 
-.034 -.538 .591 -.060 -1.038 .300 
Demands from peer groups 
.071 1.049 .295 .140** 2.280 .023 
Perception of being targeted in 
regulatory enforcement 
.073 1.238 .217 .137** 2.513 .013 
R-Square .478   .588   
Adj. R-Square .454   .569   
F 20.379 ***  30.925 ***  
** significant at .05 level; ***significant at .01 level.  
Variation inflation factors (VIF) for all independent variables in both models were less than 5.  
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Appendix A 
Characteristics of the Interviewed Firms 
 
Name Date of interview Year of 
est. 
Number of 
employees 
(approx.) 
Size (HKD, 
approx.) 
Nature / Industry Interviewee 
A February 22, 2010 1981 2,500 n/a Wire and cable products Assistant Manager, Environment, Health 
and Safety 
B  February 24, 2010 1969 15,700 Sales (2008)  
= 6.1B 
Textiles and garments Project Manager; Corporate 
Communications and Investor Relations 
Manager 
C  March 4, 2010 Early 
1980s 
> 4800 n/a After-market printer 
consumables 
Chief Operations Officers 
D March 12, 2010 1992  > 1,200 Capital (2003) 
= 156M 
Printed circuit board services 
and products 
CEO, Chairman; Quality Systems 
Assistant Manager; Financial Controller 
E March 23, 2010 1963 n/a Confidential Home, medical and health care 
electronic products 
Managing Director 
F March 29, 2010 1982 18,000 Confidential Printing and paper products Director, Environment, Facilities and 
Outsourcing Management 
G March 29, 2010 1974 6,000 n/a Lingerie materials and 
accessories suppliers 
Technical Director 
H March 29, 2010  
(by FHKI) 
1987 > 2,000 n/a Precision metal stamping 
products 
Chairman 
I  March 30, 2010 1888 n/a Sales (2009)  
= a few 
billions 
Sauce products Director of Engineering and 
Manufacturing Services; Engineering 
Manager; Corporate Communication 
Manager 
J April 7, 2010 1986 > 8,000 Sales (2008)  
= 3B 
Electronics manufacturing 
services 
Chairman & Senior Managing Director 
K April 9, 2010 1997 > 6,500 Sales (2010)  
= 5.8B 
Customized knitted fabric in 
textile industry 
Chairman 
L April 12, 2010 1974 n/a n/a Home textiles Chairman; Deputy Managing Director; 
contracted environmental consultant 
M  April 12, 2010 1985 > 16,000 Sales (2009)  
= 24B 
Products in home improvement 
& construction industries 
Group Vice Chairman, Executive 
Director 
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N April 19, 2010 1953 n/a n/a Fabric and yarn production Director 
O  April 21, 2010 1969 n/a n/a Plastic and metal stationery 
supply 
Director 
P  May 14, 2010 1964 9,800  Sales (2009) = 
4.7B 
Batteries and battery-related 
products 
Director; environmental manager A & 
B*  
Q  May 17, 2010 1975 8,000 n/a Metal stamping, tooling 
fabrication and product 
assembly 
President; environmental manager* 
       * Exact title missing. 
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Appendix B 
Dimensions of Compliance Challenges 
 Loadings 
 
Perception of 
being arbitrarily 
targeted in 
regulatory 
enforcement 
Understanding of 
the enforced 
regulation 
The local EPB is inconsistent in their enforcement of environmental regulations 
.882 .209 
The local environmental protection bureau (EPB) does not seem interested in really trying to understand 
our difficulties in trying to comply with local environmental regulations 
.865 .302 
The local EPB has been very much ‗picking‘ on us in the enforcement of environmental regulations 
.789 .281 
Our relationship with local EPB has not been as constructive as it probably should be 
.192 .867 
We have been unable to get sufficient technical support from local EPB 
.280 .845 
Many environmental regulations are too complicated for us to fully understand 
.286 .696 
Eigenvalue 2.345 2.164 
Variance explained 39.091% 36.064% 
Dimensions were derived using principal component analysis with varimax rotation; same dimensions were obtained using oblimin rotation. 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index = .807; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity is significant at 0.001 level.  
 
 
 
